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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

L. POLLE! and
ESTRID L. POLLE!, His wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
Case No.

vs.

11775

JAMES W. BURGER and
LENORE
BGRGER, His \Vife,
Defendants and Appellants.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
Defendants, James and Lenore Burger appeal
from a judgment in favor of plaintiffs at the conclusion
of a trial without jury in the Third Judicial District
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Joseph G. Jeppson presiding.
1

DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VER COURT
Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the defendants
in the District Court of the Third Judicial District, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, on the 2nd day of February, 1969.
On the 27th day of May, 1969,
the trial
of the above-mentioned matter, defendants moved for
a dismissal of the action as a matter of law which was
denied; A similar motion was entered at the conclusion
of plaintiffs' presentation at trial, which was denied
without prejudice by the Court. At the conclusion of
trial, the Court rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiffs.
On the 16th day of June, 1969, pursuant to Rules
52 (b) and 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, defendants filed Motions to Amend Findings of Fact and
Conclusion of Law and Judgment and also moved for
a New Trial. The .M'tions were heard before the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson on the 15th day of July,
1969 who denied the same.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellants submit that the verdict of the
Court rendering judgment for the plaintiffs should
be reversed, and an order entered that defendants are
entitled to the relief prayed for in their Answer to
Plaintiff's Complaint as a matter of law.
2

STA'l'El\IENT OF FACTS
On .May 26, 1962, respondents entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract with a Paul and Lathel
\Vurst, which was admitted in evidence at trial as
plaintiff's exhibit No. 1. On .May 28, 1962, respondents
conveyed the property in question by \ Varranty Deed
to the \V ursts. Said deed makes no reference to the
afore mentioned Real Estate Contract nor to any interests, liens, or encumbrances as pertains to the property
conveyed. Rather, the warranty deed was executed and
delivered with no reservations. (See plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2) . This Warranty Deed was recorded .May
29, 1962.

Almost two years elapsed before the filing of the
Uniform Real Estate contract on January 4, 1964. On
that same date, said contract was purportedly acknowledged, mention of which will be made in appellants'
argument for reversal as a matter of law.
The said Wursts sold said property to the appellants by Warranty Deed dated April 28, 1966, which
deed made no reference to the Uniform Real Estate
Contract between the Respondents and the \Vursts.
At the time of this conveyance, the Wursts apparently
owed money under the terms of said contract of which
the appellants had no knowledge whatsoever.
In July of 1967, the respondents obtained a judgment against the Wursts for the balance owing on said
contract in the amount of $3,477.66 together with attorneys fees and costs.
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It was not until after the appellants had purchased
and taken possession of the property in question that
they received notice that the \V ursts owed the respondents the money representing the balance due under
said contract.
The action from which this appeal is taken resulted with the filing of the respondent's complaint to impress a Vendor's Lien on February 7, 1968, upon the
property in question.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE RESPONDENTS ARE PRECLUDED
UNDER UTAH LAW FROlVI ASSERTING A
VENDOR'S LIEN UPON THE PROPERTY IN"
QUESTION DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE
WARRANTY DEED FROM THE RESPONDENTS TO THE WURSTS, THE APPELLANTS' GRANTORS, \VAS EXECUTED AND
DELIVERED \VITHOUT MENTION OF THE
EXISTENCE OF THE UNPAID OBLIGATION ON THE PURCHASE PRICE UNDER
THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT.
The case of PETERSON v. CARTER, 11 Utah
2d 381, 359 P. 2d 1055 (1961), a case almost on all
fours factually with the case a't hand, unanimously
held, that in a suit to impress a vendor's lien on prop4

erty purchased by third parties from the vendee, that
because the vendor-plaintiffs executed and delivered
\Varranty Deeds to the vendee that made no mention of
an existing and unpaid obligation by virtue of a RECORDED contract, that the plaintiffs were precluded from asserting said Lien.
The court further stated that the Plaintiffs in that
action had waived any claim to a vendor's lien due to
their failure to make mention of the same in the 'yarranty Deeds plaintiff executed to the defendant's grantors. The court specifically made reference to and relied upon Utah Code Ann., 1953, 57-1-12 where it is
stated that:
"Any exceptions to such convenants may be briefly inserted in such (Warranty) deed following the description of the land."Examination of plaintiff's Exhibit
No. 2, the warranty Deed in question, reveals there is
absolutely no mention of any Lien following the description.
This court in the PETERSON case went further
to reject the argument made that the fact that the contract was recorded should have given notice of the unpaid obligation on the purchase price. In dicta this
court said that if any notice were given by the recordation of the contract, "it was to the effect that would
lead a reasonable person to believe and assume that all
sums due under the contract had been paid and that all
the covenants inuring to the benefit of the plaintiff's
had been performed; and that if not, it was plaintiff's
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own failure to protect themselves, and they had waiYed
any claim to any real or illusory vendor's lien." PETERSON v. CARTER, 359 P. 2d at 1057.
Impliedly, this Court held that the purchasers of
the property were bonaf ide purchasers who purchased
in good faith without notice of any encumbrances and
were therefore entitled to take free of the existing lien.
See also 2 Jones on Liens, 2d Ed., 1084, P. 27, which
states that " . . . A Recital NOT in a Deed under
which a subsequent purchaser claims title will not bind
him." (Emphasis added)
Thus, the fact that, in this case now before the bar,
the contract was filed after the warranty deed was
recorded is irrevelant. Subsequent purchasers need only
look to their grantor's deed. To hold otherwise in this
case would result in the ludicrous situation that a vendor, who fails to promptly record his contract, but
rather does so two years subsequent to his conveyance
by Deed, would prevail.
In light of the above principles and well-settled
Utah law on the subject, the lower court in this case
now before the bar was clearly in error in rendering its
verdict for the respondents.
POINT II
THE FACT THAT THE UNIFOR1"1 REAL
ESTATE CONTRACT WAS RECORDED DID
NOT CONSTITUTE CONSTRUCTIYE N0-
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TICE DUE TO THE FACT THAT SAID COXTRACT 'VAS DEFECTIVELY ACKXO"rLEDGED.
The plaintiff's own testimony, see Record,
page 45, line 3, discloses the fact that the defendants
ne\·er received actual notice of the unpaid obligation in
question. Also, no mention of actual notice is made in
the plaintiff's findings of Fact and Conclusions of law,
pages 18 to 21 of the record. Thus, the question turns
on whether the recorded Real Estate Contract constituted constructive notice.
Plaintiff's exhibt No. 1, the contract in question,
reveals that the respondents, William L. Pollei and
Estrid L. Pollei, signed as the Sellers and that Paul R.
\\Turst and Lathel Wurst signed as Buyers. But the
acknowledgment by the Notary Public, a Helen R.
Fife, only acknowledged the signatures of the Sellers.
the Polleis. Now here are the signatures of the Buyers,
the
ursts ever acknowledged on the face of the contract.

,;v

Utah Code Ann., 1953, Sec. 57-1-6 reqmres that
in order to entitle an instrument to recordation and
thereby constitute constructive notice, a proper acknowledgment is required. Conversely, "An instrument
defectively executed or acknowledged is not entitled to
recordation and its record is not constructive notice."
C.J.S., Vendor & Purchaser, ss 341, p. 265.
The acknowledgment is defective in other aspects
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as well. The Record, page 50, lines 27-30, reveals that
\Villiam L. Pollei, never
one of the plaintiffs,
knew, talked with, or was familiar with the officer taking the acknowledgment, Helen R. Fife. Thus, when
the grantor is unknown to the acknowledging officer,
Utah Code Ann., 1953, Sec. 57-2-8, specifically requires
a particular form of acknowledgment, a form which was
not followed on the Real Estate Contract.
The cases are legion and the law is well-settled that
defectively acknowledged instruments do not impart
constructive notice. 1 Am J ur 2d, Acknowledgments,
Sec. 90, p. 505; 59 ALR2d 1309, Sec. 9.
POINT III
BY VIRTUE OF CERTAIN ACTIONS TAKEN BY RESPONDENTS DURING THE
TRANSACTION IN QUESTION, THEY ARE
ESTOPPED, PRECLUDED AND HAVE
WAIVED ANY
TO A VENDOR'S
LIEN.
Plaintiffs exhibit No. 2, the Warranty Deed from
the Plaintiffs-Respondents to the Wurst, the Defendants' -Appellants' grantors, as has been previously mentioned contains no reservations whatsoever of the claim'
ed Vendors Lien. There is, however, a recital of Ten
($10.00) Dollars as being the consideration for the conveyance. But the law on this aspect is well-settled:
"\Vhere the deed recites payment of !he
eration, the vendor cannot enforce his vendors
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lien for the purchase money which is in fact unpaid, as against a subsequent purchaser who was
ignorant at the time his co11veya11ce was executed
that the purchase money was unpaid." C.J.S.
Yendor & Purchaser, Sec. 401, p. 344.
Another action taken by the respondents as revealed by the complaint, at page 2 of the Record, paragraph
-!, constitutes a waiver of the claimed Lien. Said pleading states that the plaintiffs give the warranty deed,
plaintiffs exhibit No. 2, to the \Vursts, appellants'
grantors, for the purpose of effectuating the obtaining
a mortgage from Zions First National Bank (See plaintiffs exhibit No. 3). However, the law is settled that:
"A conveyance by the vendor for the avowed
purpose of enabling the vendee to mortgage the
property in order to obtain money for payments
due the vendor in order to obtain money for payment due the vendor evinces an intention to rely
on an express pledge of the hand and constitues
a waiver of the vendors implied Lien." C.J.S.
Vendor & Purchaser, \i\T aiver, Sec. 409, p. 352.
Furthermore, the mortgage itself states that the
holder thereof, Zions First National Bank, is the First
Mortgagor which further undermines the Respondents'
argument that a prior Lien existed on the property.

CONCLUSION
The appellants in this action purchased bona fide
from a fraudulent purchaser, by virtue of the fact that
they had no actual or constructiYe notice of the exist9

ence of any claim by the respondents to a Yendors Lien.
Being bonafide purchasers, the appellants must prevail in this appeal. The Respondents failed to protect
their Lien by numerous omissions and actions as ha\
been previously mentioned and should be predwled
from now asserting any claim against the appellants.
In view of the above foregoing facts and wellsettled precedents and principles of law, appellauts respectfully submit that the lower court should ha,·e upheld defendants' motion for dismissal as a matter of law,
or found in favor of the defendants at the conclusion of
the trial.
This court should reverse the decision of the lower
court for relief in accordance herewith.
Respectfully submitted,
KENT T. YANO
GLENN
Attorneys for Appellants
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